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A HYBRID COURT FOR A HYBRID WAR
Glenn M Sulmasy* & Andrea K. Logmant
With the pending closure of the detention facility at Guantdnamo Bay, Cu-
ba, and the recent decision to try Khalid Sheikh Mohammad in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York, many questions
remain. One key decision is how to adjudicate detainees at the facility, and
where they will be held once the facility is closed. Several options are being
considered by the Obama Administration. Included among these are the
continued use of the military commissions, as well as use of Article III
courts. However, neither of these existing paradigms-the military law
model or the law enforcement model, respectively-are properly equipped
to appropriately strike the delicate balance of military law, intelligence
needs, human rights obligations, and the need for justice in this hybrid war.
A third approach-a court dedicated to hear cases of international terror-
ism-is needed: the National Security Court System (NSCS). Legislatively
tailored to meet the unique nature of the current conflict, the NSCS not only
would address the hybrid nature of this conflict, but would strike a needed
balance between the competing interests of U.S. national security and our
human rights obligations to the detainees.
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past eight years, the military commissions originally or-
dered by President Bush in 2001, as well as the detention facility at the na-
val base at Guantdinamo Bay, have come under immense scrutiny and criti-
cism as a matter of law as well as policy. Once viewed as the beacon of
human rights on the southeastern tip of communist Cuba, Guantinamo Bay
has become a lightning rod of criticism both domestically and international-
ly. On January 22, 2009, President Obama, as promised in his election cam-
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paign, ordered the closure of the detention center in Guantdnamo Bay to
occur in one year. 1
The Congress, however, in a bi-partisan vote on the May 20, 2009,
dealt the President's plan to close the facility a major setback by denying
him the eighty-million dollars he had requested in order to close the facili-
ty.2 On May 21, 2009, President Obama responded to the lack of political
will for change and delivered an eloquent speech, "Protecting our Security
and Our Values" at the National Archives. 3 In the speech he outlined a mul-
ti-faceted approach for dealing with the detainees: (1) diplomatic repatria-
tion; (2) use of federal courts to try some; (3) use of military commissions
to try some; and (4) vaguely mention of another option for the seventy-five
to one-hundred detainees who were, for various reasons, determined to be
unable to have their cases tried in either the federal courts or by military
commissions--presumably this was a placeholder for potential "indefinite
detention."
4
While the initiatives put forth by President Obama (and remain un-
der active consideration) are a step in the right direction, it seems the ad-
ministration needs to go a step further. Just as the nation has reacted and
updated its response to 9/11 in so many other areas, it must do so in the le-
gal arena as well. Strategically we have created the Department of Homel-
and Security, broken the "wall" between the CIA and FBI intelligence arms,
and created the Director of National Intelligence. Tactically, we have ap-
plied the surge in Iraq-and now in Afghanistan-by using new methods to
carry out the war(s). It seems logical that we now must update our legal
regime to best meet the relatively new threat of international terror posed by
al-Qaeda and likeminded affiliates.
As we continue to be mired in the same debates that have occurred
since 9/11 about whether or not to apply either of the two prevailing para-
digms--the law enforcement model or the law of war model--it is now
clear to many that a pragmatic, politically acceptable new system to address
the detainee issue is needed.
The unique nature of this conflict requires a unique disposition; not
only is the war itself novel, but the al-Qaeda fighters are unique as
I Exec. Order No. 13,492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4,897 (Jan. 27, 2009).
2 David M. Herszenhom, In Shift, Leaders Of Senate Reject Guantanamo Aid, N.Y.
TIMES, May 19, 2009, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/O5/20/us/politics/
20detain.html.
3 President Barack Obama, Speech at the National Archives Museum: Protecting Our
Security and Our Values (May 21, 2009), available at http://futurefastforward.com/images/
stories/featurearticles/Remarks of PresidentBarackObama.pdf.
4 Id.
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well-neither warrior nor criminal.5 The detention and adjudication of these
individuals needs to be similarly tailored to the current circumstances by
utilizing a court that neither embraces the law enforcement model or the law
of war model, but rather a hybrid of these two prevailing paradigms. The
National Security Court System (NSCS) provides for the appropriate dispo-
sition of Guantinamo detainees called for in President Obama's Executive
Order and speech at the National Archives by addressing not only the deten-
tion concerns, but also provides a means for prompt adjudication of cases.
This proposal provides a framework for the Obama administration to "fur-
ther the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States
and the interests of justice."6
II. THE NEED FOR A NEW SYSTEM: A HYBRID WAR
Within the U.S., the two existing paradigms-the law enforcement
model and the military law model-are not suited for the unique nature of
the country's current conflict. As mentioned earlier, using the existing Ar-
ticle III courts is not appropriate for confronting this relatively new threat of
international terrorism. The military commissions, while initially employed
in 2001 as the best means available for trying the detainees, now appear
unworkable or unmanageable for dealing with the alleged al-Qaeda fighters.
Almost seven years after the attacks of 9/11, it is critical to move
the debate on detention forward. To date, the advocacy has essentially been
divided into two camps: (1) those who view the conflict with al-Qaeda as
requiring a law enforcement response and thus civilian courts and the due
process ordinarily accorded U.S. citizens; and (2) those who view the con-
flict as an armed conflict, believing the law of war paradigm to be appropri-
ate for handling the detainees. Unfortunately, neither solution is working
effectively. To say the least, this is an extremely difficult problem to ad-
dress. This new armed conflict of the twenty-first century has shattered all
previous notions of traditional warfare. Thus, neither paradigm fits neatly.
Components of each paradigm are ideal to implement while others could
never be successfully applied in the context of the al-Qaeda detainees.
The armed conflict we are fighting is truly a mix of law enforce-
ment and warfare, and the al-Qaeda fighter is a mix of international criminal
and traditional warrior. Viewing the conflict in this fashion-as a hybrid-
both of the prevailing paradigms alone is ineffective as a framework for
detention and prosecution. While military commissions are firmly grounded
5 See GLENN SULMASY, THE NATIONAL SECURITY COURT SYSTEM: A NATURAL
EVOLUTION OF JUSTICE IN AN AGE OF TERROR 158 (2009).
6 Exec. Order No. 13,492, supra note 1, § 2(b).
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in history, statute, and Supreme Court jurisprudence,7 they are not the most
appropriate forum to address al-Qaeda for many reasons.
Taking into account the history of military commissions in wartime,
as well as the use of federal courts to try terrorist cases throughout the latter
half of the twentieth century, the proposed system described below offers a
delicate mix of the two prevailing systems in order to achieve justice in the
generational war most anticipate. Jim Benjamin and Rich Zabel have pro-
duced and excellent book supporting the use of civilian courts for trying
terrorists for Human Rights First,8 but they have mainly concentrated on
cases prior to the attacks of 9/11. The civilian courts alone cannot possibly,
as it seems the Obama administration understands, adequately handle the al-
Qaeda cases and still achieve the balance between national security and the
rule of law. Just as solely using the military commissions has failed, the
U.S. must resist the temptation for the pendulum to swing too far back in
the other direction. The reality is that the military commissions and the civi-
lian system have failed to best meet the needs of policy makers and the po-
litical branches. They are not equipped to properly strike the balance of mil-
itary law, intelligence needs, human rights obligations, and the need for
justice-both perceived and actual.
Critics of the military commissions and the detention of combatants
at Guantinamo have increased dramatically over the past five years. Until
2008, we did not have a single prosecution in the seven years since the order
establishing military commissions in 2001. 9 Allegations about the harsh
treatment of detainees in the detention center-such as the claim by Amnes-
ty International in 2005 that Guantdinamo is the "gulag of our time"--have
had a major impact on how the commissions are viewed internationally. 10
Reports that the detainees were tortured-particularly after the Abu Ghraib
incident in Iraq-added to concerns of government leaders about GuantA-
namo both domestically and internationally. Greater focus was placed on
the operations at the detention center by nongovernmental organizations, the
media, and the U.S. government. Some of these allegations were accurate;
7 See SULMASY, supra note 5, at 164.
8 See JAMES J. BENJAMIN JR. & RICHARD B. ZABEL, IN PURSUIT OF JUSTICE: PROSECUTING
TERRORISM CASES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS (May 2008). See also JAMES J. BENJAMIN JR. &
RICHARD B. ZABEL, IN PURSUIT OF JUSTICE: PROSECUTING TERRORISM CASES IN THE FEDERAL
COURTS 2009 UPDATE AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS (2009).
9 See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (holding that the military commissions
established by the Bush administration violate the Geneva Conventions and the Uniform
Code of Military Justice).
10 AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 2005, available at http://www.amnesty.org/
enilibrary/info/POLlO/001/2005; Irene Khan, Speech at Foreign Press Association (2005),
available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/POLI0/014/2005.
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others were hyperbolic or exaggerated. Indeed, several of the more inflated
allegations have been used as propaganda tools by al-Qaeda. 11
Regardless of whether the allegations have merit or are exaggera-
tions, the impression gained by most people, both domestically and intema-
tionally, is that Guantdinamo has been tainted and in many ways is irrevoca-
bly flawed as a matter of policy. Other studies by nongovernmental organi-
zations have consistently claimed that detainees experience poor treatment,
lawlessness, and even torture. 12
III. THE NATIONAL SECURITY COURT SYSTEM
As discussed above, neither military commissions nor Article III
courts are properly equipped to strike the delicate balance of military law,
intelligence needs, human rights obligations, and the need for justice. Ra-
ther, a combination of the two paradigms, a NSCS, a court dedicated to hear
cases of international terrorism, offers a reasonable, pragmatic solution out
of the conundrum the Obama administration inherited. The system must
function as one that achieves justice, attains deterrence, satisfies our human
rights obligations, ensures civil liberties protections, maintains the support
of our international partners, and gains national consensus.
The system created would be separate from existing Article III fed-
eral courts and the military commission process. These Article III hybrid
courts would co-exist with the traditional federal courts and the military
commissions, and the courts-martial system. "We already have specialized
courts in the federal system of particularly complex issues requiring unique
knowledge, including bankruptcy, patents, copyrights, taxation, and interna-
tional trade. In short, we have ample precedent for a security-oriented court
dedicated to complicated issues requiring the development of substantive
and procedural expertise."' 3 Taking into account the history of military
11 See Video from al Qaeda's No. 2 Slams Obama, Threatens Attacks, CNN, October
5, 2009, http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/meastl10/05/mideast.al.qaeda.video/index.html
(quoting a video message from Ayman al-Zawahiri as stating "Obama claims to respect
human rights and condemn torture .... I will not ask him about his decision not to release
the detainee abuse photos and will not ask him about the program to hand over detainees to
other countries to be tortured .... ) (last visited October 21, 2009).
12 Deborah Pearlstein, Advantage, Rule of Law, AM. PROSPECT, June 30, 2006, available at
http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=adventage rule of law. It should be noted that
as of February 2009 a thirty-day review by the Obama administration has found that the
detention facility itself is in conformity with the provisions of the Geneva Conventions. See
Dep't of Def., Review of Department Compliance with President's Executive Order on De-
tainee Conditions of Confinement, at 4 (Feb. 2009), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/
pubs/pdfs/REVIEW OF DEPARTMENTCOMPLIANCEWITHPRESIDENTS EXECU
TIVEORDERONDETAINEECONDITIONSOFCONFINEMENTa.pdf.
13 Harvey Rishikof, A National Security Court, PROGRESSIVE POL'Y INST., Jan. 15, 2009,
http://www.ppionline.org/ndol/printlcfin?contentid=254869.
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commissions in wartime as well as the use of federal courts to try terrorist
cases throughout the latter half of the twentieth century, the new system
offers a delicate mix of the two prevailing systems in order to achieve jus-
tice in the generational war most anticipate.
A. Presumptively Adjudicatory
The NSCS would be a court of trials. It must be presumptively ad-
judicatory in order to ensure we properly support the rule of law. Contrary
to proposals set forth by others,' 4 preventative detention is not part of this
proposal. Although such proposals argue passionately for a preventative
detention component to any such system, we strongly believe the system
must be adjudicatory. The administration should resist making preventative
detention part of its handling of the detainees for both those detained at
Guantdinamo Bay and Bagram, but also for those inevitable future captures
in the conflict. To codify such a scheme would be to essentially bring the
numerous Guantinamo Bay problems into the U.S. The presumption should
be to try all detainees captured. For those detainees who the President or
military determine cannot (or should not) be tried for various reasons must
be reserved as the exception to the norm rather than being an integral part of
any new system.
B. Civilian Oversight
The Department of Justice needs to be the lead agency overseeing
the prosecutions within the NSCS. This shift in oversight from the Depart-
ment of Defense to the Department of Justice will help remove some of the
allegations of unlawful command influence (UCI) raised by both military
defense counsel as well as the government prosecution team(s). 15 It is criti-
cal that the Department of Defense no longer oversee the detention process.
Having civilian oversight by Article III judges will send a strong signal of
change.
14 See Jack L. Goldsmith & Neal Katyal, The Terrorists' Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 11,
2007, at A19. See, e.g., BEN WIITEs, LAW AND THE LONG WAR: THE FUTURE OF JUSTICE IN
THE WAR ON TERROR (2008); ANDREW C. McCARTHY, WILLFUL BLINDNESS: A MEMOIR OF
THE JIHAD (2008).
15 See Morris D. Davis, A WOL Military Justice, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2007, available at
http://articles.latimes.com/2007/dec/l0/news/OE-DAVISIO (last visited October 21, 2009);
Ross Tuttle, Unlawful Influence at Gitmo, THE NATION, March 28, 2008, http://www.
thenation.com/doc/20090414/tuttle (last visited October 21, 2009).
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C. Jurisdiction
The NSCS will have jurisdiction over citizens and noncitizens alike.
Similar to the Katyal-Goldsmith model, 16 it is important for the system to
not distinguish between citizen and noncitizen when handling alleged al-
Qaeda fighters. If the court system is properly constructed by Congress, the
need for any distinction should not be necessary. The NSCS will incorpo-
rate sufficient due process to satisfy any constitutional concerns. Since pre-
ventive detention is not part of the NSCS, the alleged terrorists, regardless
of citizenship, will be tried in rapid fashion. Any decreased expectation of
constitutional protections would likely be de minimus.
Ensuring that the NSCS retains jurisdiction over citizens and nonci-
tizens alike removes the unintended inequality that alleged U.S. citizen al-
Qaeda fighters would have greater rights than al-Qaeda fighters from other
nations. For example, suppose two suspected al-Qaeda members' communi-
cations are intercepted by U.S. intelligence agents. One suspected al-Qaeda
member is a U.S. citizen and the other Canadian. The intercept reveals that
the two suspects are conspiring to plant explosives in and around the White
House and are assisting in coordinating assassinations of key members of
the administration staff. Under the existing process, the U.S. citizen would
be granted full access to U.S. courts of justice while the Canadian would be
subject to the NSCS. This seems unintentionally unfair. Worse yet, envision
the ramifications internationally if a Yemeni and a U.S. citizen were in-
volved in a situation similar to the one presented above. To avoid such in-
equity, NSCS jurisdiction should extend to both citizens and noncitizens
regardless of nationality
Similarly, legislation creating the NSCS should be clear that per-
sons subject to the court, regardless of citizenship, are those alleged to be
current or former members of al-Qaeda or affiliated groups that engaged or
plan to engage in acts of international terrorism. Congress needs to clarify
that the NSCS's jurisdiction does not cover "any terrorist," but only those
who engage in international terrorism. This removes the fear of some that
the court would have jurisdiction over any group or entity that engages in
terrorism. The limited jurisdiction of the NSCS would serve as a check on
any arbitrary use of the court system.
D. Judges
The NSCS has life-tenured Article III judges with law of armed
conflict expertise to preside over the trials. The judges will be appointed by
the President with the advice and consent of the Senate in the same manner
that all federal judges are appointed. As with all Article III judges, this en-
16 See Goldsmith & Katyal, supra note 14.
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sures that the specialized court is composed of different jurisprudential phi-
losophies depending upon the President in office. These judges, however,
will be expected to possess the educational background necessary to deter-
mine the legality of intelligence gathering, terrorist surveillance, and other
necessary areas in the field of terrorism and national security. Several scho-
lars advocating against judicial intervention in the war correctly note that
those who are making such decisions now are not necessarily versed in this
unique area of the law. 17 As Andy McCarthy has noted, judges hearing cas-
es within the existing federal criminal justice system:
Tend to elevate individual rights at the expense of public safety (which is
to say, at the expense of the public's collective rights). When opportunities
for creativity present themselves-which frequently happens due to a per-
vasive elasticity in the rules governing judicial proceedings, over which
judges have a degree of supervisory authority-judges are hard wired to
err on the side of providing more process. 18
This is completely appropriate for the criminal justice system in
which the stakes are not nearly as high as within the national security arena.
Specific deterrence in a national security context, however, is often essential
in protecting the citizenry. Congress, when drafting the legislation for the
court, must be specific as to the importance of the system as well as the
limited authority of the court. As McCarthy and Velshi note, the legislation
needs to limit the creativity of the court.19
There will be nine judges at any given time assigned to the court.
As a result of the inordinate amount of resources needed and problems with
empanelling a jury, bench trials would be the only option available to adju-
dicate the cases against the alleged war criminals. Juries, in many ways un-
manageable in the national security context, will not be available to the ac-
cused. Empanelling a "jury of peers" for international terrorists is imprac-
tical and unlikely. The proceedings will have three-judge panels, and the
system envisions two panels available or operating at any given time. In
order to convict, a simple majority will be required (two to one) and un-
animity of the panel will be necessary for any capital cases brought by the
prosecution. The three judges "out of the court rotation" will be used for all
habeas appeals which will remain confined within the national security
court system apparatus. Additionally, such special judges will be used for
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) warrant applications. The du-
ties of the judges would include the following: (1) the judges would have
17 See John Yoo, Courts at War, 91 CORNELLL. REv. 573, 587-91 (2005).
18 Andrew C. McCarthy & Alykhan Velshi, Outsourcing American Law: We Need a Na-
tional Security Court 30 (Am. Enter. Inst. for Pub. Policy Research, Working Paper No. 156,
2009), available at www.aei.org/paper/100038.
19 Id.
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oversight of the trials; (2) single-judge panels, when in rotation, would hear
habeas petitions; (3) the judges would have oversight of the detention and
any legal issues arising or emerging from such detentions; (4) the three
judges not in the trial rotation would handle all issues surrounding FISA
applications/warrants and serve on the FISA court; and (5) the judges would
hear any cases or trials determined initially by the D.C. Federal District
Court to be of a national security nature and that deal with issues of the war
with al-Qaeda or other international terrorist organizations.
Other proposals for security courts argue against civilian judicial
involvement in the proceedings. They argue that such involvement will limit
the effectiveness of the Commander-in-Chief during war operations.2 °
Whether one agrees or disagrees about having civilian judges in this
process, the nature of this war seems to necessitate some form of judicial
intervention more than has been custom or standard in previous U.S. mili-
tary war and operations. The strictly military law system (UCMJ courts-
martial or the military commissions) or many of the antiquated norms ex-
pressed in the Geneva Conventions or the ever-evolving customary interna-
tional law do not necessarily apply to the cases against al-Qaeda fighters.
The key is to balance, and legislatively guide, national security judges to
equate justice in this arena as distinct from that of military criminal law or
ordinary federal courts. The stakes in the national security courts are much
greater than they are in standard federal courts. As it is currently con-
structed, the existing system allows for judges who have no background in
warfare or national security to intervene, hear, and decide cases when they
have little or no understanding of the issues which are beyond the scope of
the judges' expertise. 21 The legislation creating the NSCS must be specific
and make clear to the judges that the NSCS is not an ordinary criminal court
and, as such, the judges should refrain from making analogies to the civilian
system in deciding their cases. The threat we face demands these enhanced
requirements for specialized judges on this specialized court.
E. Prosecution Team
Prosecutors assigned by the Department of Justice National Securi-
ty Division would represent the government and exercise prosecutorial dis-
cretion over whether to proceed in cases. Direct supervision of the NSCS
would be conducted by the chief, Criminal Division of the Department of
Justice and ultimately the Associate Attorney General of the U.S. The pow-
20 See, e.g., John Yoo, The KSM Trial Will be an Intelligence Bonanza for al Qaeda,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 16, 2009, at A23, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB20001424052748704431804574537370665832850.html.
21 See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 64-65 (1981) (overruling a three-judge panel and
deferring to Congress' judgment regarding military decisions).
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ers of these prosecutors, as in other nations that employ separate systems of
justice for detaining and prosecuting terrorists would be great, but the pros-
ecutors would still operate under the ethical rules governing all U.S. attor-
neys. Different from other security courts implemented in foreign nations
during the later part of the twentieth century, such as those used in France,
their powers would not be unlimited and they would certainly not serve as
judges.
Moving to a Department of Justice sponsored system helps guaran-
tee that seasoned civilian practitioners would carry these vital caseloads.
Active duty military Judge Advocates (JAGs), however, would still be as-
signed-or what is known as being "detailed" in military parlance--to the
court system to provide their expertise, particularly in military matters and
the law of armed conflict, to the Department of Justice lawyers conducting
these prosecutions. This has already begun, as the Hamdan military com-
mission had Department of Justice lawyers working alongside the active
duty military lawyers. This should become the norm in the NSCS.
F. Defense Team
Active duty JAGs would serve as government-provided defense
counsel. This group would be similar to those provided for the detainees in
the military commissions. The JAGs would be made available by the De-
partment of Homeland Security 22 and the Department of Defense. Initially,
a pool of ten JAGs would serve on defense teams. If desired, the accused
may employ, at his expense, civilian counsel as long as the civilian counsel
has requisite classified document clearance. In being able to access civilian
counsel (as is currently the case) the defense can secure some of the best
legal minds and litigators in the country, if desired. The funds to support
civilian counsel would likely be generated by NGOs, advocacy groups, and
philanthropists interested in supporting a fair trial. In the spring of 2008, a
fund such as this emerged known as the John Adams fund. 3 Its specific
intention is to ensure adequate representation for the five high-value detai-
nees held, and in June 2008 arraigned, at Guantdnamo. 24 Also, the govern-
ment should provide additional funds to the defense team to ensure access
to civilian counsel. Affording such opportunities ensures alleged interna-
22 The U.S. Coast Guard is one of the five armed services and its lawyers are Judge Advo-
cates. It is the only armed service not within the Department of Defense. The U.S. Coast
Guard falls under the Department of Homeland Security.
23 The John Adams Project is a fund/program created and jointly run by the ACLU and the
National Association of Defense Lawyers. It was formally launched on April 3, 2008. It is
intended to assist the detainees in Guantinamo Bay by providing funds and support for de-
fense counsel representing the accused. See http://www.aclu.org/safefree/detention/
johnadams.html.
24 See id.
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tional terrorists with a defense team more than capable of handling their
cases. Further, this would help satisfy some of the international concern
about any perceived lack of adequate representation. The international
community often refers to the military commissions as "shams. 25 In part,
this is because they strongly believe the "trials" are heavily weighted
against the accused.26 The NSCS again would respond to those concerns by
ensuring that the top civilian lawyers could be retained by the accused.
G. Presumptively Open Trials
The NSCS will conduct open hearings. However, as a result of the
sensitive nature of intelligence gathering (means and methods employed) as
well as the desire to ensure that such hearings do not become propaganda
tools for the enemy, 27 NSCS judges would be permitted to close the pro-
ceedings to the public when necessary. Statements, evidence, witness testi-
mony, and other courtroom activity could all be exploited by the enemy for
future attacks. Certainly, it is important to maintain the openness of our
procedures and to showcase the NSCS's benefits. However, when drafting
the proposed legislation, Congress cannot be blind to the potential ramifica-
tions of complete transparency or "openness." Na'fvet6 will be no excuse for
facilitating the next attacks on U.S. soil. As Judge Posner has astutely noted,
adherence to our constitution is not a suicide pact.2 8 This need to ensure that
the trials could be closed at times is not to create a "star chamber," expand
executive power, or to exert the State Secrets Doctrine into areas where it
was never intended to be used,29 but rather to protect the military members
and government agents fighting in the ongoing armed conflict against al-
Qaeda.
A frightening example of the potential harm in keeping the courts
open occurred when the "blind sheik" Omar Abdel Rahman was tried in the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York for his participa-
tion in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. The prosecution team, in the
25 See Cynthia Banham, Amnesty Attacks Hicks Trial as Sham Justice, SPRING
MORNING HERALD, Feb. 15, 2005, available at http://www.smh.com.au/news/Global-
Terrorism/Amnesty-attacks-Hicks-trial-as-sham-justice/2005/02/14/1108229936602.html#
(describing the Guantanamo Bay Military commissions as a "broken process") (last visited
Oct. 21, 2009).
26 See id.
27 See JOHN C. Yoo, WAR BY OTHER MEANS: AN INSIDER'S ACCOUNT ON THE WAR ON
TERROR 198 (2006) ("Abu Ghraib has become a propaganda bonanza for America's enemies
and critics ....").
28 See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME
OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY (2006).
29 See Louis Fisher, State Your Secrets, LEGAL TIMES, June 26, 2006, available at
http://www.pogoarchives.org/m/gp/gp-Fisher-06262006.pdf.
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federal civilian court, complied with ordinary rules of discovery and turned
over two-hundred possible co-conspirators. 30 Within days, this detailed ac-
count of which entities the U.S. law enforcement were pursuing and why
they were thought to be affiliated with al-Qaeda was produced and shared
with the defense team. It was, essentially, a blueprint of U.S. counterterror-
ism operations. Without question, national security officials throughout the
country were concerned. We later found out, within days of being turned
over to the defense legal team, that the entire list was in bin Laden's hands.
He was able to see who had yet to be discovered as part of the al-Qaeda
network. Certainly such knowledge impacts the national security of the U.S.
Further, the information could be studied by al-Qaeda to determine impor-
tant aspects of U.S. counterterrorism activities: who might be "leaking" al-
Qaeda information; current trends of the CIA and FBI intelligence collec-
tion programs; informants' names and addresses; and other critical, sensi-
tive means of gathering intelligence.
Congress should be mindful of these considerations when drafting
the new legislation. The NSCS statute should offer specific lists and guide-
lines detailing when judges are permitted to close the trials. Such legislation
detailing when the trials can be closed by the judges should include (1) the
court's discussion of specifics on the means and methods of intelligence
collection; (2) the risk of mentioning nations involved in supporting U.S.
efforts at combating terrorism; (3) identification of informants; (4) informa-
tion that would impact ongoing military operations or covert intelligence
operations; and (5) other items deemed by the court to be of such a sensitive
nature as to overcome the Western legal tradition's time-honored presump-
tion of an open court for trials.
Another legitimate concern of an open court can be the use of the
courtroom as a propaganda platform for al-Qaeda. In addition to the case in
the trials of the perpetrators of the World Trade Center bombings in 1993
and the Moussaoui case,31 such antics have been employed most recently
during the arraignments of the five al-Qaeda members suspected of coordi-
nating, plotting, or planning the attacks on 9/11, including Khalid Sheik
Mohammad. 32 As distasteful and harmful as it may be, this outrageous be-
havior should generally be permitted within the NSCS. Open access to the
media and the public should remain as much as practicable. The presiding
judge, however, shall be granted liberal discretion to limit such use of the
court's resources for actions that are deemed, by the judge, as nothing more
30 See generally McCARTHY, supra note 14, at 41-50; McCarthy & Velshi, supra note 18,
at 3.
31 See Yoo, supra note 27, at xi, 128.
32 See Michael Isikoff & Mark Hosenball, Disorder in the Court: Inside the Gitmo Ar-
raignment of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, NEWSWEEK, June 5, 2008, available at
http://www.newsweek.com/id/140159.
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than propaganda. This diminution of the accused rights is so de minimus as
to not impact the proceedings or his due process rights but rather to ensure
that the courtroom does not become a circus.
It is critical to note that even when the NSCS judge determines that
the court must be closed for security reasons, some outside observers will
still be permitted to attend and observe. This is important for both appear-
ance and reality. Such "observers" will include representatives from several
appointed NGOs (Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, Human
Rights First), representatives from the U.N., and select members of the me-
dia to ensure the fairness of the trial and to witness the procedural protec-
tions expected of a nation dedicated to upholding the rule of law. Each ob-
server, however, would have to maintain appropriate security clearance
prior to the trial's commencement. At any point during the trial, if the judge
believes the conduct of the "observers" during or after the trial goes beyond
the authority to "observe," the judge will have the authority to remove such
an observer from the trial. The legislation will mandate that ten "observers"
may attend the closed session: three from NGOs, three from the U.N., and
four from the media. Keeping observers in the courtroom, even during
closed sessions, will ensure that there is outside oversight of the process and
will validate the proceedings as in conformity with our human rights obliga-
tions. Within the U.S. and internationally, such transparency will be critical
to support these trials and the NSCS.
H. Detention on Military Bases Within the U.S.
The detention and trials of alleged terrorists will be conducted on
military bases located within the continental U.S. This move would help
satisfy most Congressional concerns and ensure the closing of Guantdnamo
once and for all. To some, the holding in Boumediene33 was officially the
beginning of the end of Guantdnamo as a detention center in the war on al-
Qaeda. Even avid supporters of military commissions conceded that the
commissions were now doomed. Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Detainee Affairs, and current Fellow at the Heritage Foundation Cully Stim-
son, declared, "This signals the end of Gitmo. 34 We strongly agree. Impor-
tant to U.S. foreign policy, the closing of the camp will have major signific-
ance to the world. Correctly or incorrectly, over the past seven years the
base has come to signify the alleged evils of the U.S.-led war on terror.
Combined with Abu Ghraib, the public relations damage caused by allega-
tion of human rights abuse at Guantdnamo has tainted U.S. efforts there
" See 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
34 See Michael Abramowitz, Critics Study Possible Limits to Habeas Corpus Ruling,
WASH. POST, June 14, 2008, at A5 (discussing Cully Simon's assertion that Guantinamo Bay
will close).
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permanently. That, coupled with the realities of new Supreme Court prece-
dence, makes the need for using some facility within the continental U.S.
more logical. However, the political realities of using civilian prisons for
detention of these prisoners must be measured as well. As discussed earlier,
although there has been harsh criticism by many in Congress about Guantd-
namo and the commissions, we have witnessed great bi-partisan pushback
by many of our policy makers against having these alleged terrorists
brought back to main street U.S.A. The not-in-my-backyard syndrome will
be in full swing. The U.S. electorate, even with its vast compassion and
concern for fairness and justice, remains on high alert for future terrorist
attacks. It is likely that many citizens would not be pleased with having
alleged al-Qaeda fighters in their local federal prisons. Politically, in most
parts of the country relocating the al-Qaeda fighters to cells where they
would be mixed in with ordinary criminals will give pause to a number of
members of Congress. It is unlikely that many politicians running for office
will fight to bring the detainees into their own districts. However, bringing
al-Qaeda fighters into military brigs on protected U.S. military bases should
be more palatable to both the policy makers and the electorate. Although
some still contend that the best scenario remains sending many of the detai-
nees back to their countries of origin for prosecution, recent diplomatic ef-
forts has shown that most of these countries will not accept them. 35
Furthermore, as leaders in this fight against international terrorism,
it is the duty of the U.S. to take responsibility and try these detainees. Select
military bases will be used as detention centers and the military courtrooms
located on the base will be used for the actual prosecution. Military bases
are ideal for several reasons: (1) They are secure; (2) there is room to house
the detainees; (3) the professional military can oversee the detentions; (4)
using military bases captures and reaffirms the notion that these are war
criminals; (5) the military base can provide adequate safety for the civilian
judges as they perform their work; and (6) using military bases will appro-
priately limit the access of those interested in attending the proceedings.
This would keep the detainees held in a location that is secure (similar to the
stated rationale for holding the al-Qaeda suspects at Guantdnamo) but will
incur less of the controversy associated with the U.S. holding citizens of
other nations at a remote location. This would, in part, also remove some of
the international concerns about the detention center having been previously
located in Guantdnamo. Under the NSCS, the detainees will now be located
on U.S. soil. In using the military bases, the thousands of unlawful bellige-
rents held in Afghanistan, and Iraq, could be brought to these bases to be
35 See, e.g., Tarah Park, Australia Officially Rejects US Request to Accept Guantanamo
Detainees, JURIST, January 4, 2009, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2009/01/australia-
officially-rejects-us-request.php.
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detained and tried both now and in the future. Under the NSCS, alleged and
convicted U.S. military criminals will be held at the same location as the
international terrorist. Locating the alleged al-Qaeda fighters within the U.S.
will answer myriad allegations of arbitrary treatment, and even suggestions
of torture of the detainees will likely be mitigated. Such steps forward, in
and of themselves, will help to reduce some international cynicism of U.S.
intentions and actions regarding the detainees. Without question, sections of
the brigs would have to be separated for only those convicted by the NSCS.
Doing so would be for the safety of our own armed forces, but it would also
distinguish the war criminals from ordinary military criminals. Keeping
unlawful combatants or even POWs on a military base but separated from
ordinary military criminals has been the practice in ordinary armed conflict
for generations.
Military brigs are the most appropriate place to detain accused ter-
rorists because they are secure and afford the same protection against abuse
given to convicted U.S. service members who are tried, convicted, and sen-
tenced under the UCMJ by courts-martial. Using military brigs is also a
subtle reminder that this is a war and that the al-Qaeda fighter is a military
detainee. Unquestionably, having the detainees alongside members of the
U.S. military will go a long way toward reducing international concerns of
torture and unfair tribunals. In doing so, some of the negative images of
U.S. soldiers fostered by the events at Abu Grahib, and the legitimate criti-
cism following, are likely to be mitigated. Additionally, keeping the detai-
nees within our nation provides an additional appearance of process and
certainly removes much of the taint of having held the detainees in the base
at Guantdnamo for the past seven years. Locations such as Fort Leaven-
worth in Kansas seem appropriate as places to detain, try, and imprison per-
sons accused of engaging in international terror. Since Eisentrager has been
essentially overruled by recent cases,36 the extraterritoriality needs are no
longer applicable and, in essence, are moot. Guantdnamo, as a detention
facility, must close.37
I. Procedure, Evidence, and Burden of Proof
As in any proposed legislation, many changes are likely to occur
during the ordinary legislative process. This is particularly so when Con-
gress begins wrestling with many of the minute details of the NSCS proce-
dure and evidence. It is recommended that the proposed legislation adopt
virtually all procedural aspects of the Military Commissions Act of 2006
(MCA).38 The rights afforded within the MCA greatly exceed those of most
36 See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
37 See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
38 Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600.
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nations and virtually all international tribunals, including the International
Criminal Court (ICC) codified in the Rome Statute. There will be five criti-
cal areas of distinction: (1) habeas appeals will be permitted but different
from what was mandated in Boumediene; (2) the death penalty sentencing
provisions will be altered; (3) there will be a right of interlocutory appeal at
any point in the proceeding allowing the prosecution to challenge any court
order regarding evidence, to be available if the judge deviates from the le-
gislatively adopted rules of the new court; 39 (4) the appellate structure will
be tailored specifically to the National Security Court System; and (5)
statements obtained in violation of the Convention against Torture, the Ar-
my Field Manual, or Federal Law will be inadmissible.
The right to determine the status and propriety of detention are at
the heart of Western traditions of law. Although it is critical to distinguish
war criminals from ordinary criminals, there still must be some form of
right for the detainees to challenge their detention. Contrary to many critics'
assertions, there was a mechanism in place within the MCA. This mechan-
ism was not the traditional habeas proceeding, but it did allow the detainees
to challenge their detention. Prior to the Boumediene decision, the Detainee
Treatment Act (DTA) of 2005 applied a two-level review process-the
military review of the detention annually known as the Combat Status Re-
view Tribunals (CSRTs), and, when appropriate, review by the D.C. Circuit
(the second highest court in the land). Boumediene placed civilian judges
into a position with oversight of military detention. Within the civilian law
context, this is reasonable. However, during armed conflict such a decision
can have major impacts on the security of the U.S. 40 It seems to me the
Court was legitimately concerned about the process at Guantdnamo and, as
Justice Souter noted in his thoughtful and impassioned concurrence, the
length of time the detainees have been in custody without charges. 41 How-
ever, the Supreme Court may have overreacted to these perceived injustices.
The Supreme Court has now formally given greater due process rights to the
detainees than would be afforded to prisoners of war under the Geneva
Conventions. 42 This is simply not the best means to ensure the legality of
the detainees' detention. The NSCS will ameliorate these suggested weak-
nesses contained within the Supreme Court's holding. The NSCS ensures a
habeas corpus hearing is held before a civilian Article III federal judge but
without necessarily granting constitutional rights to noncitizens captured
outside the U.S. The system, once again, captures the middle ground.
39 McCarthy & Velshi, supra note 18, at 32.
40 See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2291 (2008) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
41 Id. at 2278 (Souter, J., concurring).
42 See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War arts. 98-107,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
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The National Security Judge, an impartial and detached magistrate
(not in the in the trial rotation) would conduct the habeas hearings with mili-
tary JAGs representing the government as well as the detainees. The
strength of this process is that it includes the military's input and can be
seen as overt recognition that this is a war requiring military expertise while
still retaining civilian oversight of the process. This will respond, to some
degree, to the recent concerns about habeas corpus rights for detainees
while still remaining faithful to the Supreme Court's ruling in Boumediene.
The three-judge panels in the trials will use the "beyond a reasona-
ble doubt" standard and require a two-thirds majority of the judges to con-
vict any alleged detainee. Unanimity of the three judges will be required
only for capital cases. The evidentiary standards will also be diminished
from standard, civilian prosecutions--or military courts-martial for that
matter. The NSCS offers the detainee great process and protections but,
necessarily, a decreased expectation of the process ordinarily afforded U.S.
citizens. No detainee should, by virtue of his or her status, have traditional
U.S. constitutional rights attach. Specifically, the Fourth and Fifth Amend-
ment rights so precious within our judicial system must necessarily be re-
duced in significance or removed altogether in the NSCS. To do otherwise
would be to ensure acquittals in virtually all cases against the detainees. As
some scholars have suggested, such actions would be absurd. 3 However, if
al-Qaeda suspects are searched or questioned on U.S. territory and are U.S.
citizens, such protections would still exist, although at a reduced level. The
exclusionary rule (excluding evidence from being considered by a court
when constitutional violations have occurred in obtaining it), which is court
created and not necessarily envisaged by the Constitution per se, would not
be applicable within the NSCS. To permit application of the exclusionary
rule would undoubtedly wreak havoc on the proper adjudication of the
detainees. The NSCS permits reasonable accommodations without uninten-
tionally reducing standard constitutional protections afforded citizens of
the U.S.
A "speedy trial" rule will be part of the NSCS. Again, the national
security court system we propose would be presumptively adjudicatory
while still providing sufficient opportunity for intelligence professionals to
do their jobs and glean valuable, current information from those detained.
Distinguishing the system from the military commissions and other propos-
als for a new security court, rules will regulate both the length of time be-
fore detainees are charged and the time required for commencement of a
trial. The NSCS requires all detainees, from point of capture, to be charged
43 Ruth Wedgwood, Op-Ed., The Case for Military Tribunals, WALL ST. J., Dec. 3, 2001,
at A18. See also Ruth Wedgwood, Al Qaeda, Terrorism, and Military Commissions, 96 AM.
J. INT'L. L. REV., 329-37 (2002).
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within three months. Further, all trials must be initiated within one year
from the date of being charged. In this way, the system permits legitimate,
lawful interrogation of suspects over a period of time but does not permit
indefinite detention. It accounts for the needs of intelligence professionals
and also promotes the rule of law.
J Appeals
Appeals of decisions made by the NSCS shall be heard by the D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals and ultimately the Supreme Court. Deference shall
be accorded to the holding of the NSCS in all cases that come before the
D.C. Circuit Court. The cases, obviously, will not be tried de novo but will
be based upon errors committed in applying the national security court
legislation.
An alternative appeals process, if properly constructed, could utilize
some of the already existing military law appellate courts. The first level of
review of national security cases could be the already existing Courts of
Appeals of the Armed Forces (CAAF).44 This limited right of appeal would
ensure that the cases were heard by an outside panel of judges well-versed
in military law and the laws of war and who have some background in the
procedural nuances of national security law. Appellate counsel would be
provided by the Air Force, Coast Guard, Navy, Marine Corps, and Army.
However, the CAAF judges are currently Article I judges. These judges are
not life tenured, are created out of Article I of the Constitution, serve for
specified periods of time (in the case of the CAAF judges, fifteen years),
and are not viewed with the same prestige as Article III judges. Thus, if
Congress embraces this alternative appeals process, it would have to ensure
that the CAAF judges are reconstituted as Article III judges (those federal
judges who are created out of the judicial branch, or the third article of the
Constitution) with life tenure within any proposed legislation. In doing so,
this alternative appeals process would make the CAAF the first level of
review, the D.C. Circuit as the second level of review, and the Supreme
Court as the court of last resort after a proper writ of certiorari has been
issued.
K. Death Penalty
To make the death penalty acceptable to our international partners,
the system envisions modifying the existing federal rules regarding it. Un-
der this system, the death penalty would still be an authorized punishment,
but only if the accused is a citizen of a country where such punishment is
44 Currently, the Court of Appeals of the Armed Forces uses Article I judges who are the
second layer of review for military appeals. They are an all-civilian panel that provides the
necessary "check" from problems inherent within the military system as discussed herein.
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authorized. For example, if a citizen of Great Britain is detained, life in
prison would be the highest level of punishment authorized. Since the death
penalty is viewed as a human rights violation within the European Union
(EU), it is important in this global conflict to maintain support from our
traditional allies.45 One way of ensuring support would be to recognize the
expectations and rights of citizens of other nations. The unique nature of
this war demands that we be overtly conscious that the enemy we fight is
not from one or two nations as in traditional armed conflict. Many detainees
are from nations that are allies of the U.S. Every effort should be made not
to alienate such allies and their citizens from the ongoing, generational
struggle. Overt gestures such as the modification of the death penalty stan-
dard within the NSCS are not "the solution" but rather one step toward heal-
ing wounds incurred in relationships over the past seven years.
Even if deemed applicable in a particular case, the death penalty
would be authorized only in those cases deemed sufficiently egregious to
warrant it and those that severely impact the national security of the U.S.
Certain aggravating factors would have to be developed and codified by
Congress to distinguish between what cases are appropriate for life sentence
and what could merit capital punishment. Recognizing that this would still
cause concern among our European and other international colleagues, this
proposal certainly requires further elaboration by the Congress and the
White House prior to implementation.
L. Sunset Provisions
A legitimate concern of those opposed to such a court is the poten-
tial for abuse. In order to ensure that the system is working as intended, as
well as not being abused by any future administration, the legislation creat-
ing the court must have a five year sunset provision. This is reasonable, and
appears necessary to ensure prevention of any excess or perhaps a reduction
in the need for this specialized court.
IV. THE WAY AHEAD
Prior to the anticipated closure of the Guantdnamo Bay Detention
Facility on January 22, 2010 many questions remain. To date, no decision
has been made regarding the transfer of the detainees. In August 2009 it was
reported that the Obama Administration is reviewing a proposal that would
45 The European Union is strongly opposed to the death penalty and has become increa-
singly alarmed at the number of cases occurring in America. See Universal Declaration of
Human Rights art. 3, G.A. Res 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/810
(Dec. 12, 1948) ("Everyone has the right to life ... ").
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bring the detainees to U.S. soil. 46 The reported proposal'would transfer
Guantnamo detainees to a U.S. federal prison facility, would allow for
prosecution of detainees in either federal criminal courts or under military
commissions, would co-locate a court facility with the prison facility, and
would allow for preventive detention of detainees considered a threat to
U.S. security interests.47 The potential transfer of detainees to U.S. facilities
is raising public concern and many in Congress have publicly resisted this
48
notion.
This potential forum shopping is also problematic, sets a dangerous
precedent, and will likely lead, if implemented, to numerous defense chal-
lenges. It is, however, a recognition of the hybrid nature of this war with al-
Qaeda. There must be a dedicated process and forum for addressing the
detention and adjudication of the detainees. Congress has made it clear that
it will not approve the requested funding for transfer of prisoners from
Guanttnamo until there is a definite plan in place.
The NSCS is fundamentally a balance and a reasonable accommo-
dation of many competing legal and policy interests. It is structured upon
the foundations of the U.S. understanding of the rule of law. The NSCS
exceeds the standards of most requirements of international law and em-
braces human rights by ensuring that the dignity of each alleged detainee is
maintained. It is an outgrowth--or an evolution-of the military commis-
sions. It provides the answer for policy makers to get us out of the quick-
sand we find ourselves in regarding detainees. We have been attempting to
force the civilian justice model or the military justice model onto a new
entity-the al-Qaeda fighter. Neither will work. The proposed system pro-
vides a delicate balance between the competing interests of U.S. national
security and our human rights obligations to the detainees. The NSCS pro-
vides an adjudicatory system of justice that will answer the needs of policy
makers for years to come. We simply cannot remain mired in the ways of
the past or the ideals of our generation, but rather must step forward with
pragmatic idealism as our guide and promote the rule of law while bringing
unlawful combatants to justice.
46 Lara Jakes, Yemeni at Guantanamo: Prisoner Without a Country, ABC NEWS, Aug. 2,
2009, available at http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/wireStory?id=8233003; Lara Jakes, Ad-
ministration May Set Up Military-Civilian Prison to Hold Guantanamo Inmates, ABC NEWS,
Aug. 2, 2009, http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/wireStory?id=8232290.
47 See, e.g., Jakes, Yemeni at Guantanamo: Prisoner Without a Country, supra note 46.
48 See, e.g., Ewen MacAskill, White House Confirms Guantdnamo Detainees May Go to
Michigan or Kansas, GUARDIAN ONLINE, Aug. 3, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/
world/2009/aug/O3/guantanamo-detainees-fort-leavenworth-michigan (stating that "[Obama]
is finding [closing Guantinamo] harder than initially anticipated and has met resistance from
members of Congress opposed to having inmates transferred to their states, citing fears this
make their states magnets for a terrorist attack.") (last visited October 21, 2009).
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The NSCS offers the U.S. and the Obama administration a "way
out" of the Guantdinamo fiasco. 4 9 The existing military law tribunal system
is simply not meeting the needs of the nation or the West as we battle inter-
national terror. Similarly, the current federal civilian courts are not the ap-
propriate forum for adjudicating "war crimes" either. The convergence of
law enforcement and warfare embodied in the war on al-Qaeda presents
new dilemmas and confusion for nations determining which scheme or sys-
tem to employ. The situation is unprecedented. Not only is the war itself
novel, but the al-Qaeda fighters are unique-neither warrior nor criminal.
They commit, or conspire to commit, acts of international terror and other
actions on a massive scale, seeking nothing less than the complete destruc-
tion of Western civilization. They do not wear uniforms, they do not carry
weapons openly, they have no emblems that distinguish them as members
of an organized army, and they flout the law of armed conflict as part of
their established doctrine. 50 This routinely unlawful belligerency increases
the level of threat these international terrorists pose to the world community
and makes classification of their status extraordinarily difficult. Regulating
their activities and trying the individuals in an appropriate forum has been
confusing at best. Policy makers need a third way to adjudicate war crimes
committed by these illegal combatants that will be supported, at least to
some degree, by the international community. The NSCS is a legal system
based upon this philosophy.
If properly constructed, the NSCS will help this country begin to
regain its position of moral authority in world affairs. At the minimum, it
will bolster national and international support for the U.S. which has eroded
over the past few years. It would be a fresh start and one that demonstrates
the country's recognition that changes in how we fight our war on al-Qaeda
are necessary. This new system would provide real justice, as well as the
appearance of enhanced justice, to the detainees and resilience to an adjudi-
cation process that has been admittedly unsuccessful.
49 See Glenn M. Sulmasy, The Legal Landscape after Hamdan: The Creation of Homeland
Security Courts, 13 NEw ENG. INT'L & COMP. L. 10 (2006). See also Glenn Sulmasy, Re-
deeming Gitmo, NAT'L REV. ONLINE, July 28, 2005, http://www.nationalreview.com/
comment/sulmasy200507280838.asp (last visited October 21, 2009).
50 See al-Qaeda Training Manual, available at www.usdoj.gov/ag/manualpartl_l.pdf. See
also Hassan Mneimneh & Kanan Makiya, Manual for a Raid, 49 N.Y. TIMES REv. BOOKS,
Jan. 17, 2002, at 18, 20.
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